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The Scottish push towards local democracy carries potential
unintended costs
The prospect of independence for Scotland is being treated by campaigners as an opportunity to instigate
meaningful political and constitutional reform, including a major devolution of powers to local and municipal
Government. But, argues Professor Paul Cairney, while it isn’t clear what the respective roles of the different
tiers of Government will be, there are unintended costs in upsetting an established constitutional order. 
The prospect of
Scottish
independence, or major constitutional change, provides a ‘window of  opportunity’ f or other polit ical
ref orms. People f eel, quite rightly, that now is the time to push their ideas, since such a major package of
ref orms is unlikely to be repeated f or a generation. It ’s now or never (or, at least, much later).
One proposal is to beef  up local democracy in Scotland by devolving powers f rom central to local
government and making sure that local decision making involves more public participation. You can see this
recommendation made in newspapers such as The Herald (‘A chance to revitalise our local democracy’)
which f ocuses specif ically on more devolution of  powers to local government (or, at least, those in
Glasgow and the islands councils) and in the Electoral Ref orm Society’s (ERS) much more ambitious report
Democracy Max.
The ERS presents this idea as part of  a whole package, considering how to f ind the Holy Grail of  polit ics in
which power is devolved readily (rather than hoarded by central government) and the public has a greater
incentive and opportunity to engage with polit ics in a meaningf ul way (by localising key decisions and
introducing policy- inf luencing bodies drawn f rom a cross-section of  society).
There are at least two unresolved issues to consider alongside such ref orms. They perhaps represent the
unintended, practical, consequences of  a policy, based on principle, to enhance local democracy:
What would be the role of the Scottish Parliament?
Currently, Scotland has a f airly tradit ional Westminster system in which the Scottish Government is
accountable to the Scottish Parliament. It is unicameral, prompting the design of  a ‘f rontloaded’ legislative
system to address the lack of  a revising chamber. Scottish Parliamentary committees may seem more
‘powerf ul’ in relation to many of  their Western European counterparts because, f or example, they have a
combined standing/ select committee f unction (to f oster committee expertise) and they consider legislation
bef ore plenary at the principles and amendment stages (they can also init iate legislation). However, they are
not particularly powerf ul in relation to the Scottish Government or the public sector. The government makes
policy and the parliament provides a degree of  scrutiny limited by a lack of  resources (and f actors such as
the whipping power of  parties, particularly when a single party or coalit ion has a majority). In particular, it
lacks the ability to gather inf ormation independently – it tends to rely on bodies such as the Scottish
Government to provide that inf ormation. While it can oblige, say, Scottish ministers to attend meetings to
provide inf ormation, such tools have a limited ef f ect.
The experience of  14 years of  devolution is that the Parliament struggles to hold the Government to
account because: (a) it does not get enough inf ormation f rom the Scottish Government about what is
going on locally (indeed, Scotland lacks the top-down perf ormance management system that we associate
with the UK Government); and, (b) local authorit ies of ten push back against calls f or detailed inf ormation –
f or example, they say they are not accountable to the Parliament because they have their own elections
and mandates.  This has been a particular f eature of  central- local polit ics since 2007, when the Scottish
Government signed a concordat with COSLA (Convention of  Scottish Local Authorit ies) to reduce the
‘micromanagement’ of  local authorit ies by central government.
More devolution to local authorit ies would exacerbate this tension between local and national
accountability. In turn, it should prompt us to think about what the Parliament is there to do. Is it there to
consider only the Scottish Government’s broad strategies or should it get its hands dirty looking at the
outcomes in detail? At the very least, we should consider the extent to which new mechanisms to enhance
local democracy will replace adequately the f unctions of  the Scottish Parliament. Will they have the same
legitimacy as an elected Scottish Parliament which is of ten seen to represent the centre of  popular
participation and governmental accountability? Scottish independence would also raise the stakes of  this
debate, prompting us to think about the ability of  a Scottish Parliament to scrutinise, f or example, the links
between economic policy and public service delivery, but without the same ability to gather inf ormation on
all aspects.
What would be the role of Scottish-level groups?
Currently, most Scottish policy is processed by civil servants who consult regularly with organisations such
as interest groups. The evidence to date suggests that most ‘lobbying’ to the Scottish Government and
Parliament is done by (a) other parts of  Government and (b) prof essional and interest groups –
representing local authorit ies, local authority prof essions, the medical and health prof essions, businesses,
business groups, the third sector, and so on. Civil servants rely on groups f or inf ormation and advice, and
they of ten f orm long term, ef f icient and productive relationships based on trust and regular exchange.
When policy is made at the Scottish level, those groups organise at the Scottish level – establishing bases
in or near Edinburgh and spending their ‘lobbying’ t ime in consultation with civil servants. One consequence
of  devolving power locally is that these groups must reorganise, to shif t f rom lobbying one national
government to 32 local governments.
For example, the Scottish Council f or Voluntary Organisations’ (SCVO) role may shif t f rom a national voice
f or hundreds of  small groups to a national resource to aid those groups when they engage locally. There is
nothing wrong with that in principle, but it should prompt us to consider the local dynamics of  consultation
in at least two ways. First, there are likely to be clear winners and losers in this new setup. The well-
resourced prof essional groups will be OK. However, the groups working on a shoestring budget, with one
or two members of  paid staf f , only able to lobby the Scottish Government and Parliament, will struggle. In
other words, the ref orms may benef it the ‘usual suspects’. Second, who will take the place of  the smaller
groups?
The ERS’s suggestion is that more local devolution produces a more active local population, but we need
to know more about how and why people organise. It seems intuit ive that local communities may organise in
an ad hoc way to address major issues in their area as they arise, but the thing about established groups is
that they have a constant presence and that they of ten get a handle on the details of  policies over t ime.
They represent a f orm of  institutional memory in a way that ad hoc campaigns would not.
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